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Abstract
The established consensus is that voters do not hold European Union leaders accountable for their
management of the economy in European Parliament elections, which contributes to the EU’s democratic
deficit. However, the existing research misses a comparison between those who feel that the national
government is responsible for their economic situation and those who feel the EU is responsible. The analysis
is based on surveys of the 28 EU members. I find that when one assigns more responsibility to the EU than
the national government for national economic conditions, satisfaction with the economy increases the
likelihood of voting for the European People’s Party, the dominant party group in the EU. This study presents
the first evidence of individuals’ accountability-holding behaviour towards the EPP.
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TITLE:  How voters hold the European People’s Party accountable in European Parliament 
elections 
ABSTRACT 
The established consensus is that voters do not hold European Union leaders accountable for 
their management of the economy in European Parliament elections, which contributes to the 
EU’s democratic deficit. However, the existing research misses a comparison between those who 
feel that the national governm nt is responsible for their economic situation and those who feel 
the EU is responsible. The analysis is based on surveys of the twenty-eight EU members. I find 
that when one assigns more responsibility to the EU than the national government for national 
economic conditions, satisfaction with the economy increases the likelihood of voting for the 
European People’s Party, the dominant party group in the EU.  This study presents the first 
evidence of individuals’ accountability-holding behavior towards the EPP. 
Key words:  European People’s Party, Voting Behavior, Public Opinion, European Parliament, 
Elections 
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A growing body of scholarly research points to European Parliamentary elections as a 
sign that the European Union (EU) possesses a democratic deficit, where citizens cannot hold 
EU leaders accountable.  The role of the European Parliament (EP) is to serve as an electoral 
connection, but existing research shows that EP elections reflect domestic political conflicts 
involving the national government, and the performance of EU leaders do not shape voters’ 
choices (Hix and Marsh 2007; Hix and Marsh 2011; Hobolt and Tilley 2014a; Weber 2011; de 
Vreese et al. 2006).  These findings have major implications for democratic accountability, 
because they suggest that the role of elections has diminished in policy-making in Europe.  This 
study presents evidence to the contrary by showing that citizens evaluate the EU’s management 
of economies and vote in EP elections based on its performance. 
Do voters reward EU leaders for their performance, and under what conditions does this 
behavior occur?  The established consensus is that voters do not reward EU leaders.  In other 
words, Europeans do not engage in ‘economic voting’ based on the EU level of governance in 
the EP elections.  While the existing research addresses the responsibility one assigns to the EU, 
what it misses is a comparison between those who feel that the national government is 
responsible for their economic situation and those who feel the EU is responsible.  In a context 
where national governments and the EU share authority, the responsibility one assigns to both 
the EU and one’s government for the economy needs to be used when explaining vote choice. 
Following the competency model of economic voting, voters condition their choice on 
the incumbents’ record of economic performance “because this is the optimal way to identify and 
elect competent economic mangers under conditions of uncertainty” (Duch and Stevenson 2008, 
2).  I argue that voters recognize the center-right parties of the European People’s Party (EPP) as 
the most powerful party group in EU politics.  The European People’s Party is a party group 
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in the European Parliament comprised of center-right parties throughout the EU’s 
members.  They won 36 percent of EP seats in 2009 and 29 percent of EP seats in 2014, 
making the EPP the largest party group in the parliament.  Politicians from the EPP not 
only have the most votes in the parliament, but they also have led the European 
Commission in recent years (the Barroso Commission and the Juncker Commission). 
Moreover, the first two elected Presidents of the European Council have been members of 
the EPP (Herman Van Rompuy and Donald Tusk).  The EPP held the most representation 
in the European Councils with thirteen heads of government at the time of the 2009 EP 
election and eleven heads of government at the time of the 2014 EP election, which include 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel who arguably is the most influential politician in 
Europe.  If the voters hold the EPP accountable, the EU signals competence in economic 
management to voters, alongside the signals they receive from the national government. Voters 
recognize the EU’s influence over national economies, discern whether the EPP’s leadership 
subjectively acts in their economic interest, and vote accordingly.  I expect that the positive 
effect of satisfaction with the national economy on one’s likelihood to vote for the EPP increases 
as one views the EU as more responsible for the economy in comparison to one’s government. 
In this study I gauge the conditions under which economic voting affects votes for the 
European People’s Party (EPP), the dominant, incumbent political group at the EU level, which 
includes the largest number of European Parliament members (MEPs), the European 
Commission Presidency, and the European Council Presidency.  The analysis is based on the 
European Election Studies’ surveys of 28 European states, representing the 2009 and 2014 
European Parliament elections.  In order to operationalize the responsibility one assigns to the 
EU, I construct a measure that separates those who attribute more responsibility to the national 
Page 3 of 40
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/geui
Journal of European Integration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
government for the economy and those who attribute more responsibility to the EU for the 
economy. 
I find that the positive effect of economic satisfaction on the likelihood of voting for the 
EPP increases, as voters assign greater responsibility to the EU for national economic conditions. 
Hence, Europeans exhibit key behaviors that are necessary for an accountable EU democracy, a 
political system where people make their political decisions based on the performance of the 
EU’s leadership (desiring more competent managers of the economy).  I show that these results 
do not hold when I exclude respondents’ considerations of the responsibility of the national 
government.  The analysis shows that these effects are stronger in the Eurozone, where the stakes 
in the EU’s economic management are high. 
Holding the European Union Accountable in European Parliament Elections 
While the European Union has acquired more powers over the years, existing research 
suggests that the people do not pay attention to the European Union level governance, they are 
not excited by EP elections (reflected in low voter turn-out), and they make their vote choice in 
EP elections based on national issues (Hix and Marsh 2007; Hix and March 2011; Schmitt 2005). 
Hence, elections arguably are functioning less as mechanisms to influence policy-making, and 
the EU institutions shape more policies in an environment that is insulated from electoral 
outcomes (Nanou and Dorussen 2013).  This phenomenon is called the ‘democratic deficit’ and 
it presents a puzzle for researchers:  if the EU has power over important policies, why have we 
not observed an economic vote in EP elections?   If the EU’s performance as managers of the 
economy shaped vote choice, a higher quality electoral connection between citizens and the EP 
would exist; thereby alleviating the democratic deficit.  Do voters hold EU leaders to account for 
their governance? 
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The existing research suggests that EU elections are second-order elections where the 
national context dominate the voters’ considerations.  Hix and Marsh (2007) examine changes in 
the vote shares received by parties between a European Parliament election and the last national 
election. They show that losses in the EP elections are function of the government size. They 
suggest that European Parliamentary elections provide voters serve as an opportunity to punish 
the national incumbents, more so than a protest against the EU.  They further argue that “Europe 
remains at best a minor element in these elections in most cases… these general findings were as 
true in 2004 and they were in 1979” (Hix and March 2007: 506).  In their follow up article, Hix 
and Marsh (2011) include data from the 2009 election, and once again they find that second-
order election model holds across all the EP elections.  The parties in government and parties 
with large vote shares tend to be punished by the voters in the European Parliament elections.   
On the other hand, Hobolt and Spoon’s (2012) suggest that economic voting influences 
EP elections (see also Bartkowska and Tiemann 2015; Clarke and Rohrschneider 2009; Tilley et 
al. 2008).  When modeling citizens’ choices to vote or abstain, and citizens’ choices to switch 
parties between the EP election and the last national election, they find that concerns about 
European integration had a statistically significant effect.  They attribute these effects to the 
politicization of the EU in one’s country, which increases the salience and controversy of the 
issue of integration.   However, they do not examine whether party groups benefit in terms of 
popular support, which would indicate that voters can hold EU party groups accountable. 
Hobolt and Tilley (2014a) provide a comprehensive analyses in terms of opinions on 
responsibility assignment towards the EU and accountability-holding in the EP elections.  
Alongside Hobolt and Tilley (2014b), they show that dissatisfaction with economic conditions 
influences the responsibility assigned to the EU.  They show that when one supports the EU and 
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has a positive economic evaluation, one is more likely to assign responsibility to the EU for the 
economy. They refer to this responsibility-assignment as group serving attribution bias (people 
who like the EU assign it credit for subjectively good things).  They elaborate on the economic 
vote and how voters evaluate the performance of the incumbent EU leadership.  They define 
incumbency by membership in the European People’s Party, the dominant political group at the 
EU level.  Voters recognize the center-right parties as the most powerful forces in EU politics.  It 
follows that a positive evaluation of the national economy would be expressed in a vote for the 
EPP (an economic vote).  They find null results, which suggest that we cannot be confident that 
voters make their EPP vote choice based on their economic situations.  They interpret this result 
to mean that voters do not hold EU leadership to account for its past performance.  Voters 
ostensibly were not able to discern who to blame at the EU level for the management of the 
economy.   
What Hobolt and Tilley’s approach misses are the different targets of voters’ blame in 
Europe’s multi-level system of governance: both the EU and the national government.  In a study 
of national elections in Southern European countries, Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2012) show that 
voters are less likely to reward governments for good economic performance when they assign 
more responsibility to the EU for the economy. They also show that those who assign more 
responsibility to the EU than the national government are less likely reward governments with 
their votes.  However, voters may be able to find new targets of blame in their economic voting.  
EP elections provide a context where voters can vote directly for politicians who help make 
regional policies that constrain the national governments.     
 I incorporate the competency model of economic voting into the study of EP elections 
(Duch and Stevenson 2008).  In this model, the signals received by voters about their economic 
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context are altered by institutions. This suggests that the European Union’s perceived role in 
economic affairs affect who one rewards for one’s economic satisfaction, which one expresses 
with one’s vote choice.  A subjective signal is picked up by individuals about the EU’s role in 
economic affairs which leads them to discern the EU leadership’s responsibility, and makes the 
EU’s leadership an object of judgement for one’s economic evaluations.  Voters then make their 
choice based on who performs best in terms of their economic interest. 
Furthermore, citizens can receive signals from the multiple levels of governance (Duch 
and Stevenson 2008).  Europeans live in a context where national governments and the European 
Union share sovereignty over conomic matters.  Citizens can assign more responsibility to the 
national government, more responsibility to the EU, or similar levels of responsibility to both 
(Hobolt and Tilley 2014b).  The EU’s signals regarding competence in economic management 
become clearer as one views the EU as more responsible in comparison to the national 
government, which produces a stronger economic vote in favor of or against the EPP.  Those 
who assign similar levels of responsibility to both levels, or more responsibility to the national 
government, receive a murkier, less clear signal from the EU which is less likely to compel votes 
for or against the EPP. 
It follows that as one assigns more responsibility to the European Union for one’s 
national economic situation in comparison to the national government, the effect of economic 
satisfaction on votes for the EPP intensifies, because voters perceive whether or not the EPP acts 
in their economic interest.
1
  The strength of the economic vote is defined by the difference in the
probability of an EPP vote between those who are satisfied and dissatisfied with the economy 
(the effect of economic satisfaction). 
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Hypothesis:  The effect of economic satisfaction on the probability of an EPP vote 
is greater among those who assign responsibility to the EU for the national 
economy in comparison to those who assign responsibility to the national 
government for the national economy. 
Research design 
In order to test the hypothesis, I estimate statistical models using data from the European 
Election Study (EES).  The theory posits that Europeans’ attitudes about the economy and the 
EU’s policy competences influence their vote choices in European Parliamentary elections, and 
the EES provides survey data on these topics that is collected from nationally representative 
samples of populations in European states.  These data include two years of EES surveys:  2009 
and 2014, representing the European Parliamentary elections from those years.  I select these 
years due to the availability of the variables for the statistical models, described below.  These 
data include the 28 EU member states (Croatia is represented in the 2014 data, after it became an 
EU member). 
Variable measurements 
In order to operationalize votes in favor of the EPP, the dependent variable, I use the EES 
variable based on the party the respondent chose in the elections.  I created a variable where “1” 
represents respondents who voted for an EPP member party in the European Parliament 
elections, and where “0” represents respondents who voted for a non-EPP member party. 
Center-right Christian democratic and conservative parties make up the EPP.  Voters supporting 
the EPP represent 26 percent of the data in the following statistical models, the largest share of 
the vote (the socialist S&D group represents 23 percent of the votes, the second largest share). 
The EPP provides a target for voters’ blame since it represents the most powerful group 
throughout the EU’s institutions (Hobolt and Tilley 2014a). 
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 I expect that voters base their choice in favor of or against the EPP on their evaluation of 
the economy.  In order to operationalize evaluations of the economy, I use the EES variable 
based on the question: 
What do you think about the economy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you think 
that the general economic situation in [country] is… A lot better (1), A little better 
(2), Stayed the same (3), A little worse (4), A lot worse (5) (EES 2014, 13).   
 
Around 56 percent of respondents believed that the economy got a little worse or a lot worse, 24 
percent believed that the economy stayed the same, and 20 percent believed the economy got a 
little better or a lot better.   
 In order to operationalize the responsibility assigned to the national government, I use the 
EES variable based on the question:   
First, thinking about the economy, how responsible is the [country] government 
for economic conditions in [country]? Please indicate your views using any 
number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “no responsibility” and 10 means 
“full responsibility”. (EES 2014, 9-10) 
 
Around 78 percent of the respondents believe that the national government is largely responsible 
for the economy (a score above “5”), which indicates that most people attribute responsibility for 
the national economy to the national government.  However, this measure is only part of puzzle.  
In order to operationalize the responsibility assigned to the EU, I use the EES variable based on 
the question:   
[Following the question above] And what about the European Union, how 
responsible is the EU for economic conditions in [country]? Please indicate your 
views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “no 
responsibility” and 10 means “full responsibility”. (EES 2014, 9-10) 
 
Around 58 percent of the respondents believe that the EU is largely responsible for the economy 
(a score above “5”), which indicates that most people also attribute the national economy to the 
EU’s governance to some extent.  When respondents answer these two questions, they tend to 
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ascribe responsibility to the institutions.  I use information from both of these items to construct 
the measure of responsibility assignment.   
If the scores respondents provided for these two items are different, then I know whether 
they feel the EU or national government is more responsible.  For instance, one could provide an 
“8” for the national government item and a “6” for the EU item, and I conclude that they assign 
more responsibility to the national government.  I subtract the national government scores from 
the EU scores, which produces a scale (-10 through 10) where positive values represent those 
who feel the EU is more responsible and negative values represents those who feel the national 
government is more responsible (in the statistical models below, the variable is rescaled to 0 
through 20).   
Around 27 percent of respondents provided the same score for EU responsibility and 
national government responsibility (the modal category), while 55 percent of the respondents 
assigned more responsibility to the national government and 18 percent assigned more 
responsibility to the EU.  These data suggest that while most respondents feel the national 
government is more responsible, a sizeable portion believe that responsibility is either balanced 
or that the EU is more responsible. The inclusion of this measure as an independent variable is 
important, because Hobolt and Tilley (2014a, 132) use only the EU responsibility scale, and they 
claim that any potential “accountability effects” in their statistical models would be an 
incumbency phenomenon.  By including a measure that distinguishes national government and 
EU responsibility, the statistical model can represent the social process of citizens relating their 
economic situations to the responsibility of the national government (whether or not it is member 
of the EPP).  Hobolt and Tilley (2014b) deploy this type of measure as a dependent variable, but 
Hobolt and Tilley (2014a) do not use it as an explanatory variable.   
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[Table 1 Around Here] 
In Table 1, I present cross-tabulations of the percentage of votes for the EPP across 
the groups of theoretical interest.  Those who feel that economy was doing well and assign 
responsibility to the EU exhibit a higher percentage of votes (27.7 percent) for the EPP in 
comparison to those who feel that the economy was doing well and assign responsibility to the 
national government (24.6 percent). The three percentage points may seem small, but it is 
substantively meaningful in EP elections. For instance, the EPP’s loss of around eight percent in 
the 2014 election yielded a 49 seat loss, while the right-wing’s eight percent boost yielded a gain 
of 89 seats.  Among those who feel that the economy was doing badly, the percentage of EPP 
votes was similar between those who assign responsibility to the EU (25.9 percent) and the 
national government (26.5 percent).   
Other factors may confound the theoretical links between these variables. The EPP may 
benefit from group-serving attribution bias among those who feel that the economy is doing well 
(see also Hobolt and Tilley 2014a; 2014b). In other words, people who like the EU attribute a 
good economy to the EPP more readily than those who dislike the EU (Hobolt and Tilley 2014a: 
21; Tilley and Hobolt 2011).  Hence, I include a control variable for support for the EU so I can 
be more confident that I am estimating a performance-evaluation effect as opposed to a group-
bias effect.  Similarly, I introduce a control for left-right ideology (11 point scale) because 
conservatives may be more likely to reward the EPP with their vote if they perceive a good 
economic management, while socialists may be less likely to reward the EPP for successes.   
Hobolt and Tilley (2014) introduce a control variable for affiliation with the EPP in 
their statistical model explaining vote choices for EPP.  These data suggest that EPP 
affiliation predicts 86 percent of EPP vote choices, suggesting they measure the same 
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phenomenon.  Including EPP affiliation does reduce statistical significance in the EPP vote 
model, but the hypothesized directions of the effects hold when I hold this variable at EPP 
supporters and non-supporters in the statistical models.  I also include a variable for age in 
order to account for the pro-EU stances among young people, as well as favorability to 
conservative parties among older voters (Gabel and Palmer 1995).  Socioeconomic 
variables did not have comparable scales across the 2009 and 2014 surveys, but their 
inclusion within models representing each year did not change the substantive findings.  A 
variable representing subjective social class (10 point scale: (1) the lowest level in society – 
(10) the highest level in society) is included in the models containing only 2014 data.   
Model estimation 
 To test the hypotheses, I estimate statistical models which allow me to compare changes 
in one’s likelihood to vote for the EPP among the groups of theoretical interest, with respect to 
important control variables.  I create an interaction term between one’s economic evaluation and 
one’s responsibility assignment.  This interaction allows me to test for the effect of economic 
evaluation conditional upon the institutions to which one assigns responsibility for the economy.   
 I estimate a logit model due to the binary dependent variable (1 = EPP vote, 0 = non-EPP 
vote), where 26 percent of the observations are EPP votes.  I estimate a mixed effects logit 
model, where I let the intercepts vary by country-years, which represents the 55 European 
Parliament elections that occurred across the nations in the two years of data.  The mixed effects 
model is appropriate because these data include individuals within the member-states across two 
election cycles.  In order to avoid biased parameter estimates, I model the context of the 55 
elections, where individuals may have distinctive experiences (Luke 2008).  The intra-class 
correlation coefficient (ICC) for the null model with no independent variables shows that the 
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election-level accounts for around 47 percent of the variation of the dependent variable, which 
demonstrates the necessity of including the random effects.  The results hold if I estimate the 
models with fixed effects dummy variables for country-years.  I also conducted a cross-
validation of the results where I split the data randomly into two groups estimated the statistical 
models, and calculated the mean squared error (Brier scores) for each group:  0.272 and 0.268, 
respectively.  The similar mean squared errors between the groups suggest the statistical model 
accurately represents the theoretical social process of interest.   
As a robustness check, I substituted the subjective economic evaluation with GDP growth 
(for country-year), which yielded statistically significant results in the expected direction. The 
results also hold if I include a control for political knowledge (correct answers to political 
questions).  In order to check for temporal effects (years are a component of the random effect), 
including a dummy variable representing the year 2014 yielded a statistically significant, 
negative effect on EPP votes (the EPP lost votes that year), but did not affect the findings.   
Results 
 Table 2 presents the results of the mixed effects logit model with random intercepts for 
country-years.  In the model in the middle, I did not include interaction terms.  In the model on 
the right, I did not include control variables.  The coefficient for the EU responsibility scale is 
positive statistically significant in the interaction-less model, which suggests that finding the EU 
responsible for the economy increases the likelihood of an EPP vote.  Feeling the economy got 
worse was negative and statistically significant in the interaction-less model which suggests that 
negative economic evaluations reduce the likelihood of an EPP vote.   
[Table 2 Around Here] 
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 Moving to the model on the left with interaction terms, EU responsibility scale is positive 
and statistically significant which suggests that finding the EU responsible for the economy 
increases the likelihood of an EPP vote, when one thinks that the economy is doing well (when 
Feeling the economy got worse equals zero).  Assigning responsibility to the EU helps the EPP 
when someone feels the economy got better over the past twelve months.  Feeling the economy 
got worse was positive and statistically insignificant, suggesting that I cannot be confident about 
the direction of the effect on EPP voting from economic evaluation when someone feels that the 
national government is completely responsible for the economy.  The interaction term EU 
responsibility scale x Feeling the economy got worse is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that as one assigns responsibility to the EU for the economy, the effect from a bad 
economic evaluations increases.  These results also hold among those who did not vote for the 
EPP’s constituent parties in last national election, although they have a lower level of statistical 
significance.    
 When considering the control variables, the results for the interaction model that 
contained the controls and the model that did not contain the controls yield the same substantive 
results, although the model with controls had a better model fit (a lower BIC).  The coefficients 
for the controls yielded the assumed signs and possessed statistical significance, suggesting the 
older, more conservative, pro-EU people are more likely to vote for the European People’s Party.  
Moreover, including a squared term for ideology in order to take the anti-EPP views of the 
radical left and radical right into account did not affect the substantive results (although it was 
statistically significant).   
 For the hypothesis, I graph the predicted probabilities of an EPP vote among those who 
feel the economy got worse and those who feel the economy got better, across the different 
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levels of responsibility assignment.  I represent those with good economic evaluations with 
respondents who said “a lot better”, and I present those with bad economic evaluations with 
respondents who said “a lot worse”. When I use the “A little better” and “A little worse” 
categories, the substantive findings remain the same with smaller effect sizes.   
[Figure 1 Around Here] 
 The results were calculated using statistical simulations, holding the control variables at 
their mean values.  Figure 1 suggests that the difference between who think the economic did 
well and poorly is greater among those who feel the EU responsible in comparison to those who 
feel that the national governm nt is responsible, at a 95 percent confidence level.  This result is 
further suggested by the difference in predicted probabilities (the bottom panel of Figure 1), 
which are greater (in terms of positive values) among those who feel the EU is responsible in 
comparison to those who feel that the national government is responsible.   
 The aforementioned results follow my expectations.  If voters can hold EU leaders 
accountable, those who feel the EU is responsible for good economic conditions should be more 
likely to support the EPP, the dominant political group at the EU level.  The results support this 
line of argumentation.  Those who feel the economy is doing well reward the EPP as they feel 
the EU is more responsible for the economy.  On the other hand, those who feel the economy is 
doing worse sustained a similar probability of voting for the EPP across different levels of 
responsibility assignment.  However, when looking across the available two years of data, only 
2009 had substantive results.  In 2009, the EU’s average GDP growth across the 27 members (-
5.8, in these data) was considerable lower than the growth in 2014 (0.4).  The findings hold with 
respect to control variables for GDP growth.  The average Feeling the economy got worse score 
was 3.2 in 2009 and 2.2 in 2014, suggesting that European’s felt better about the economy in 
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2014.  More data collection in upcoming elections is necessary, but this initial trend 
suggests that worse economic conditions produces a stronger economic vote in European 
Parliament elections.   
[Table 3 Around Here] 
 These results are counterintuitive in the context of the aforementioned literature which 
suggests that Europeans do not consider the EU’s leadership when making their vote choice in 
European Parliament elections.  Hobolt and Tilley (2014a) estimate models concerning vote 
choice for the EPP, and they use an EU responsibility scale which does not incorporate opinions 
about the national government.  Their approach does not distinguish between those who assign 
more responsibility to the EU and national levels.   Hence, I estimated models using their 
measure (EU responsibility assignment alone) and this study’s measure, which include EU and 
national responsibility assignment (see Table 3).  The Hobolt and Tilley models yield the weak 
effects on EPP voting from their study, while this study’s model yields the hypothesized effects.  
The smaller and statistically insignificant EU responsibility scale in the Hobolt and Tilley model 
indicates that responsibility assignment do not substantively influence one’s probability of voting 
for the EPP when one feels satisfied with the economy (a key posit from the competency theory 
of economic voting).   Moreover, the larger and statistically significant Feeling the economy got 
worse indicates that economic evaluations affect voting for the EPP when voters assign no 
responsibility to the EU for the economy. But voters should not reward the EPP if the EU has no 
responsibility for the economy.  Their measure does not take one’s responsibility assignment for 
the national government into account.  In this study’s model, those who assign full responsibility 
to the national government (and no responsibility to the EU) do not reward the EPP based on 
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their economic evaluations (a small and statistically insignificant Feeling the economy got worse 
in this study’s model).    
These results as well as the worse model fit (higher BICs in the Hobolt and Tilley models 
in comparison to this study’s model) suggest that the inclusion of responsibility assignment for 
the national government matters.  When I split the data by year, Hobolt and Tilley’s approach 
also did not yield statistically significant findings.  These results suggest that EU considerations 
were stronger in the 2009.  The findings from these comparisons further suggest the presence of 
an accountability vote among Europeans in EP elections, although this voting may be qualified 
by the context of the election year.   
[Table 4] 
 Overall, the models above suggest that voters reward the EPP for a good economic 
performance.  But where is this economic voting occurring?   The results suggest that places 
where people do not hold the EU responsible for the economy (but hold the national government 
responsible instead), there will not be an economic vote.  Following Hobolt and Tilley (2014b), 
the EU’s influence over national economies vary systematically, with nineteen EU members 
being part of Economic and Monetary Union (the Eurozone).  In these countries, the European 
Central Bank has power over monetary policy and the Councils set fiscal obligations for the 
member governments.  Therefore, I expect that citizen considerations of the EU’s economic 
management has a stronger effect on voting for the EPP in the Eurozone in comparison to 
citizens outside of the Eurozone.   
For the measure of responsibility, the mean score was “9” for Eurozone countries and “8” 
for non-Eurozone countries, which indicates that Eurozone citizens assign more responsibility to 
the EU in comparison to non-Eurozone citizens but this difference is small.  When I subset the 
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data by Eurozone status, the statistical models suggest the economic vote occurs in the Eurozone 
countries where the citizens arguably have a higher stake in the economic policies of the EU (see 
Table 4).  In the Eurozone countries, the interaction term EU responsibility scale x Feeling the 
economy got worse is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that as one assigns 
responsibility to the EU for the economy, the effect from economic evaluations increases.  
Meanwhile, the effects in the non-Eurozone countries are smaller and statistically insignificant.  I 
estimated the non-Eurozone countries with and without the UK (which does not have an EPP 
member, so in the logit models the UK has no “1” observations), and the results of the non-
Eurozone model in Table 4 hold with and without the UK.  This difference between the 
Eurozone and non-Eurozone held in 2009, but in 2014 statistical models representing Eurozone 
and non-Eurozone states did not yield statistically significant results.  
I also need to estimate effects with respect to the national government leadership 
under EPP parties.  In several cases, the national EPP party leads the national government.  
The EPP had thirteen heads of government at the time of the 2009 EP election and eleven 
heads of government at the time of the 2014 EP election. When an EPP leader is head of 
government, then voters’ likelihood of voting for the EPP may be positively correlated with 
voters’ economic satisfaction regardless of whether the voter believes the EU is responsible 
for the economy or the national government.  Hence, I estimate models for when the head 
of government is an EPP member and when the head of government is not an EPP member 
(see Table 5).    
The main finding holds across these two models.  As one assigns more responsibility 
to the EU for the economy, satisfaction with the economy increases one’s likelihood of 
voting for the EPP, whether the EPP parties are in or out of power in the national 
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government.  In the “EPP in Power” model, economic satisfaction had a greater positive 
effect among those who assigned more responsibility to the EU, in comparison to those who 
assigned more responsibility to the national government.  In the “EPP Not in Power” 
model, those who feel the national government is responsible for the economy are less likely 
to vote for EPP parties when they think the economy is doing better.  This lower likelihood 
of voting for the EPP suggests a greater willingness to support the incumbent leadership, 
which is rewarded for better economic conditions.  Among those who feel the EU is 
responsible for the economy, this ‘economic vote’ towards the national incumbent goes 
away.  In the “EPP Not in Power” model, those who feel the EU is responsible for the 
economy are more likely to vote for EPP parties when they think the economy is doing 
better (although the difference between those who think the economy is doing better and 
those who think the economy is doing worse is not statistically significant).   
Overall, those who feel that the EU is responsible for the economy treat the EPP parties as 
the incumbent when voting in European Parliament elections, in comparison to those who 
feel the national government is responsible.  This comparison holds when the EPP parties 
are in power or out of power.   
I also need to estimate effects with respect to one’s partisanship in elections for the 
national governments.  Around 6.5 percent of citizens voted against the EPP parties in the 
most recent national elections, while they did vote for the EPP parties in the next European 
Parliament elections.  What explains their change of heart between the national election 
and the EP election?  This questions poses a more robust test of the hypothesis, because 
these voters turned away from the center-right parties in elections for the national 
government.  If responsibility assignment to the EU for economic conditions drives voting, 
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then they should drive votes for the EPP, even among those that did not support the EPP’s 
constituent parties in the member states (see the non-EPP partisan models in Tables 2 and 
3).  The findings hold in the non-EPP partisan models.   
 
Conclusions 
 Do voters reward EU leaders, and under what conditions does this behavior occur?  I 
show that the economic performance matters when voters choose to vote for the European 
People’s Party.  This study presents the first empirical evidence in favor of individuals’ 
accountability-holding behavior towards the EU’s leadership.  This study builds on the research 
on voting behavior in EP elections by taking considerations of the national government and EU 
responsibility into account.   
The findings indicate that existing evidence and arguments in favor of a ‘democratic 
deficit’ may be overstated.  This study suggests that voters who recognize the EU’s powers over 
national economies, discern whether the EPP subjectively acts in their economic interest, and 
vote accordingly.  Hence, Europeans exhibit key behaviors necessary for a competitive EU 
democracy, where voters choose which the EU’s direction through their evaluations of the EPP’s 
performance.  The findings also indicate that countries which arguably have the biggest stakes in 
EU economic policies (the Eurozone) exhibit economic voting in EP elections; suggesting that 
voters recognize the influence of the economic management of the EU on their national 
economic conditions.  The findings point scholarly research towards questions about the factors 
that lead to this recognition in the Eurozone (such as political messages from the EU and national 
governments).  However, the findings are qualified by the lack of statistically significant results 
in 2014, when responsibility assignment did not affect voting.  The year 2009 experienced a 
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worse economic condition in comparison to 2014, which may have contributed to the urgency of 
economic voting. This project points to future research which can substantiate the argument that 
the economic crises increases economic voting with regards to the EU’s leadership (as more data 
is collected in EP elections).   
These findings not only have implications for the EU but also worldwide, where 
globalization arguably constrains national governments (Duch and Stevenson 2008; 2010; 
Hellwig 2008).  Globalization, stronger international agreements, and more international 
organizations do not necessarily have to limit voters’ say in politics (Hix and Marsh 2007; Hix 
and Marsh 2011).  Legislative bodies at the regional and international level could provide 
opportunities for voting based on the politicians’ management of economies.  On the other hand, 
Hobolt and Tilley (2014a, 136) point out that there is no parliamentary government in the 
European Parliament, where the number of MEPs in each party group would determine who 
governs the EU.  The influence of economic voting is constrained in EP elections in comparison 
to the national context, where members of parliament select the government.  Voters have the 
capacity to evaluate the EU’s economic management in EP elections, and institutional reforms 
could allow these votes to directly inform who rules Europe. 
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Table 1: Percentage of European People’s Party votes by one’s feeling the economy is 
getting worse and one’s assignment of responsibility for economic conditions.   
 The European Union more 
responsible 
The national government 
more responsible 
Feeling the 
economy got better 
27.7% 
(990) 
24.6% 
(2,822) 
   
Feeling the 
economy got worse 
25.9% 
(2,420) 
26.5% 
(8,060) 
EU responsibility scale: national government responsible (0) – EU responsibility (20). 
“The EU more responsible” represents values above 10 on the scale.  “The national 
government more responsible” represents values below 10 on the scale. Feeling the 
economy got worse:  A lot better (0) – A lot worse (4). “Feeling the economy got 
better” represents values below 2 in the variable.  “Feeling the economy got worse 
represents values above 2 in the variable. Number of survey responses in parentheses. 
Data source: European Election Study surveys 2009 and 2014. 
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Table 2: Effects on one’s likelihood of voting for the European People’s Party.    
 Full Model No Interaction No Controls Non-EPP 
Partisans 
2009 
Only 
2014 
Only 
EU responsibility scale 0.062*** 0.016*** 0.056*** 0.058* 0.089*** 0.031 
 (0.02) (0.006) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
       
Feeling the economy got worse 0.0031 -0.14*** 0.0020 0.11 0.12 -0.21** 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.1) (0.07) (0.08) 
       
EU responsibility scale x 
Feeling the economy got worse 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019* 
(0.01) 
-0.026*** 
(0.008) 
0.0009 
(0.009) 
       
Age 0.0064*** 0.0063***  -0.0058*** 0.0012 0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Left-Right Ideology 0.39*** 0.39***  0.28*** 0.38*** 0.41*** 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EU Support 0.042*** 0.042***  0.030** 0.029*** 0.061*** 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.01) (0.007) (0.009) 
Constant -4.24*** -3.83*** -1.34*** -4.72*** -3.93*** -4.65*** 
 (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) 
Random Effect 
Country-Year Variance 1.43 
(0.3) 
1.43 
(0.3) 
1.27 
(0.3) 
1.15 
(0.3) 
1.26 
(0.4) 
1.52 
(0.5) 
Survey Responses   25,519 25,519 25,519 16,469 13,227 12,292 
Bayesian Information Criterion 21,749 22,798 26,711 6,715 12,744 10,065 
Dependent variable:  EPP vote (1), non-EPP vote (0).  EU responsibility: national government responsible (0) – EU 
responsibility (20).  Feeling the economy got worse:  A lot better (0) – A lot worse (4). “Non-EPP Partisans” represents 
respondents who did not vote for EPP parties in the last national elections.  Results calculated using mixed effects logit 
models. Data source:  European Election Study surveys 2009 and 2014. Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3:  Effects on one’s likelihood of voting for the European People’s Party, comparing this study’s approach with 
Hobolt and Tilley’s approach. 
 This study’s EU 
resp. scale 
Effects using Hobolt and Tilley’s EU resp. scale: 
No EU responsibility (0) – Full EU responsibility (10) 
 Full Model Full Model 2009 Only 2014 Only Non-EPP 
Partisans 
EU responsibility scale 0.062*** 0.026 0.0011 0.039* 0.018 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
      
Feeling the economy got worse 0.0031 -0.078* -0.098* -0.085 0.018 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.0740) (0.08) 
      
EU responsibility scale x 
Feeling the economy got worse 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.0034 
(0.009) 
-0.016 
(0.01) 
-0.013 
(0.01) 
      
Age 0.0064*** 0.0063*** 0.0011 0.013*** -0.0061*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Left-Right Ideology 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.28*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) 
EU Support 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.029*** 0.059*** 0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.01) 
Constant -4.24*** -3.84*** -3.13*** -4.62*** -4.31*** 
 (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3) 
Random Effects 
Country-Year Variance 1.43 1.43 1.27 1.51 1.14 
 (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (0.3) 
Survey Responses 25,519 25,519 13,286 12,313 16,514 
Bayesian Information Criterion 21,749 22,812 12,820 10,097 6,728 
Dependent variable: EPP vote (1), non-EPP vote (0). This study’s EU responsibility scale: national government 
responsible (0) – EU responsibility (20). Feeling the economy got worse: A lot better (0) – A lot worse (4). Results 
calculated using mixed effects logit models. Data source: European Election Studies 2009 and 2014. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Effects on one’s likelihood of voting for the European People’s Party, by 
status as a Eurozone member.  
 Eurozone Non-Eurozone Together 
EU responsibility scale 0.091*** 0.020 0.062*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
    
Feeling the economy got worse 0.071 -0.077 0.0031 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) 
    
EU responsibility scale x 
Feeling the economy got worse 
-0.025*** 
(0.007) 
-0.0048 
(0.008) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
    
Age 0.0086*** 0.0018 0.0064*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Left-Right Ideology 0.42*** 0.34*** 0.39*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.007) 
EU Support 0.035*** 0.059*** 0.042*** 
 (0.008) (0.01) (0.006) 
Constant -4.47*** -3.93*** -4.24*** 
 (0.3) (0.4) (0.2) 
Random Effect 
Country-Year Variance 0.67 
(0.18) 
2.68 
(1.0) 
1.43 
(0.3) 
Survey Responses   15,556 9,953 25,519 
Bayesian Information Criterion 14,779 8,020 21,749 
Dependent variable:  EPP vote (1), non-EPP vote (0).  EU responsibility: national 
government responsible (0) – EU responsibility (20).  Feeling the economy got 
worse:  A lot better (0) – A lot worse (4). Results calculated using mixed effects logit 
models. Data source:  European Election Study surveys 2009 and 2014. Standard 
errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Effects on one’s likelihood of voting for the European People’s 
Party. 
 Full Model EPP in 
Power 
EPP Not in 
Power 
EU responsibility scale 0.062*** 0.085*** 0.023 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
    
Feeling the economy got worse 0.0031 -0.25*** 0.23*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
    
EU responsibility scale x 
Feeling the economy got worse 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.013* 
(0.008) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
    
Age 0.0064*** 0.0092*** 0.0034** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left-Right Ideology 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.35*** 
 (0.007) (0.01) (0.01) 
EU Support 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.047*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant -4.24*** -3.60*** -4.64*** 
 (0.2) (0.3) (0.4) 
 Random Effect   
Country-Year Variance 1.43 
(0.3) 
0.29 
(0.09) 
2.02 
(0.60) 
Survey Responses   25,519 11,583 13,936 
Bayesian Information Criterion 21,749 11,521 11,102 
Dependent variable:  EPP vote (1), non-EPP vote (0).  EU responsibility: national 
government responsible (0) – EU responsibility (20).  Feeling the economy got 
worse:  A lot better (0) – A lot worse (4). “EPP in Power” represents respondents in 
a country where an EPP member is head of government.  “EPP Not in Power” 
represents respondents in a country where an EPP member is not head of 
government.  Results calculated using mixed effects logit models. Data source:  
European Election Study surveys 2009 and 2014. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1:  The effects of economic evaluations on one's likelihood
of voting for the European People's Party by the responsibility
one assigns to the EU with 95% CIs
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1 
ONLINE APPENDIX 
Satisfaction with the economy and trust in EU institutions 
The competency theory raises questions not only with regards to holding the 
incumbent responsible.  One’s competence has implications for the ability to assess the 
institutions which are governed by the incumbent.  An economic vote in EP elections 
suggests that the EU signals serve as a perceptual screen that makes itself an object of 
judgement (Hobolt and Tilley 2014b).  I assume that EU signals regarding competent 
economic management alter perceptions of responsible institutions as well as the EPP’s 
leadership.  Hobolt and Tilley (2014a) examine the influence of EU responsibility and 
economic evaluations on trust in the European Union, and they show that economic 
evaluations influence trust in the European Union under the condition of assigning 
responsibility to the EU for the economy. They argue that since the EU lacks the 
institutional clarity to structure voters’ choices, “institutions themselves… are on trial” in 
terms of assessments of economic performance (Hobolt and Tilley 2014, 133).  In their 
study, trust in the EU serves as a sign of its legitimacy, and they posit that the 
trust/legitimacy of the European Union “hinges almost exclusively on its performance” 
(Hobolt and Tilley 2014, 134).  They show that performance matters for trust in the EU, 
suggesting that the EU receives credit for good and bad performances.   
It follows that if the EPP is held to account for its performance, then economic 
evaluations should influence the trust in the institutions this party group controls (further 
evidence of assigned blame).  If the EPP is doing a subjectively good job, trust in these 
institutions would increase.   
Hypothesis:  The effect of economic satisfaction on trust in the European 
Union is greater among those who assign responsibility to the EU for the 
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2 
national economy in comparison to those who assign responsibility to the 
national government for the national economy. 
People who feel that the EPP is responsible for good economic conditions also 
should exhibit higher levels of trust in the EU.  In order to operationalize trust in the EU, I 
use the EES variable based on the question:   
For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it 
corresponds or not to your attitude or opinion.  Your trust the institutions of 
the EU:  Yes, definitely (1) Yes, to some extent (2) No, not really (3) No, not 
at all (4).  (EES 2014, 9). 
Around 65 percent of the respondents trust the EU institutions at least to some 
extent, which demonstrates Europeans’ general support for EU institutions. 
In order to estimate the statistical models regarding trust in the EU, I use mixed 
effects ordinal probit models for the four-point ordinal dependent variable (with random 
intercepts for country-years). I estimate models from 2014 because the two years do not 
have equivalent measures of trust, but models from both years yield the same substantive 
finding (although the effects on trust in 2009 were smaller and held at the 90 percent 
confidence level).  I estimated the predicted probabilities for those who at least trusted the 
EU to some extent (whether one was in the “Yes, definitely” or “Yes, to some extent” 
categories).  I include control variables for age, social class, and EPP affiliation, but these 
control variables do not change the substantive findings.  In the online appendix, I graph 
the results from the trust model in Table 1, including predicted probabilities and 
differences in predicted probabilities (Appendix Figure 1).  These results were calculated 
while holding the control variables at their mean values except EPP affiliation (a dummy 
variable) which I held at its modal value, zero (the results hold when I hold EPP affiliation 
at one).  The predicted probabilities show that as one assigns more responsibility to the EU, 
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3 
trust in the EU decreases among those who feel that the economy is getting worse; while 
trust in the EU increases among those who feel that the economy is getting better.  The 
differences in predicted probabilities further substantiate this finding by showing that 
one’s belief the economy is getting better has a larger positive effect on trust among those 
who feel the EU is responsible in comparison to those who feel the national government is 
responsible.  The evidence from this statistical model back up Hobolt and Tilley’s (2014) 
claim that “the legitimacy of EU institutions is dependent on performance and on the 
extent to which people credit or blame those institutions for good and bad performance” 
(125).    
[Table 1 Around Here] 
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4 
Table 1: Effects on one’s likelihood of trusting the European Union. 
Full Model No Interaction No Controls 
EU responsibility scale 0.059*** 0.019*** 0.073*** 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
Feeling the economy got worse -0.042** -0.18*** -0.065*** 
(0.02) (0.008) (0.02) 
EU responsibility scale x 
Feeling the economy got worse 
-0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.022*** 
(0.003) 
Age 0.0007 0.0008* 
(0.0005) (0.0004) 
Social Class 0.071*** 0.072*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Left-Right Ideology 0.0093*** 0.0079*** 
(0.003) (0.003) 
EU Support 0.11*** 0.011*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
EPP affiliation 0.35*** 0.36*** 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Cut Point One 0.037 (0.07) -0.25 (0.06) -1.02 (0.06) 
Cut Point Two 1.08 (0.07) 0.79 (0.06) -0.048 (0.06) 
Cut Point Three 2.69 (0.08) 2.40 (0.06) 1.47 (0.06) 
Country-Year Variance 0.061 
(0.005) 
0.065 
(0.005) 
0.084 
(0.005) 
Survey Responses  19,524 19,524 19,524 
Bayesian Information Criterion 43,938 43,964 46,020 
Dependent variables:  Trust in EU institutions: No, not at all (0) – Yes, definitely 
(3); Agreeing with the bailouts: Totally disagree (0) – Totally agree (3).  EU 
responsibility: national government responsible (0) – EU responsible (20).  Feeling 
the economy got worse:  A lot better (0) – A lot worse (4). Results calculated using 
mixed effects ordinal probit models. Data source:  European Election Study 
surveys 2014. Standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Data source:  European Election Study surveys 2014
Figure 1:  The effects of economic evaluations on one's likelihood 
of trusting the European Union by the responsibility one assigns to 
the EU with 95% CIs
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6 
Effects from non-voters 
Table 2: Effects on one’s likelihood of voting for the European 
People’s Party, while accounting for the selection bias of voting in 
European Parliament elections. 
EU responsibility scale 0.037*** 
(0.009) 
Feeling the economy got worse -0.00012 
(0.03) 
EU responsibility scale x 
Feeling the economy got worse 
-0.0096*** 
(0.003) 
Age 0.0029** 
(0.001) 
Left-Right Ideology 0.22*** 
(0.005) 
EU Support 0.033*** 
(0.005) 
Whether One Voted in EP Elections 
EU responsibility scale 0.001 
(0.006) 
Feeling the economy got worse -0.059*** 
(0.02) 
EU responsibility scale x 
Feeling the economy got worse 
-0.0009 
(0.002) 
Age 0.014*** 
(0.0004) 
Left-Right Ideology 0.012*** 
(0.003) 
EU Support 0.034*** 
(0.002) 
Dependent variable:  EPP vote (1), non-EPP vote (0). Dependent 
variable (for the selection model): Voted in the EP election (1), 
Did not vote in the EP election (0).  EU responsibility: national 
government responsible (0) – EU responsibility (20).  Feeling the 
economy got worse:  A lot better (0) – A lot worse (4). Results 
calculated using a Heckman probit models with fixed effects of 
country-years. Data source:  European Election Study surveys 
2009 and 2014. Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7 
Controlling for partisanship towards EPP parties in EU countries. 
Hobolt and Tilley (2014) introduce a control variable for affiliation with the EPP in their 
statistical model explaining vote choices for EPP.  These data suggest that EPP affiliation 
predicts 86 percent of EPP vote choices, suggesting they measure the same phenomenon.  
Including EPP affiliation does reduce statistical significance in the EPP vote model, but the 
hypothesized directions of the effects hold when I hold this variable at EPP supporters and non-
supporters in the statistical models. 
Table 3:  Number of survey responses by whether one voted for the European 
People’s Party in European Parliament elections and whether one affiliates with the 
European People’s Party.   
Not Affiliating with the EPP Affiliating with the EPP 
Did not vote for the EPP 17,595 571 
Voted for the EPP 1,913 4,536 
Data source: European Election Study surveys 2009 and 2014.  Affiliating with the 
EPP (or not) predicts 22,131 observations and does not predict 2,484 observations, so 
Affiliating with the EPP predicts 86% of Voting for the EPP. 
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8 
Table 4: Effects on one’s likelihood of voting for the European People’s Party. 
EU responsibility scale 0.062*** 0.033 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Feeling the economy got worse 0.0031 -0.0067 
(0.05) (0.07) 
EU responsibility scale x 
Feeling the economy got worse 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
Age 0.0064*** -0.00034 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Left-Right Ideology 0.39*** 0.24*** 
(0.007) (0.009) 
EU Support 0.042*** 0.032*** 
(0.006) (0.008) 
Affiliating with the EPP 4.0*** 
(0.06) 
Constant -4.24*** -3.85*** 
(0.2) (0.3) 
Random Effect 
Country-Year Variance 1.43 
(0.3) 
0.86 
(0.2) 
Survey Responses  25,519 24,615 
Bayesian Information Criterion 21,749 14,289 
Dependent variable:  EPP vote (1), non-EPP vote (0).  EU responsibility: national 
government responsible (0) – EU responsibility (20).  Feeling the economy got 
worse:  A lot better (0) – A lot worse (4).  Affiliating with the EPP:  Affiliating (1), 
Not affiliating (0). Results calculated using mixed effects logit models. Data source:  
European Election Study surveys 2009 and 2014. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Results calculated while holding Affiliating with the EPP at one, an affiliate
Figure 2:  The effects of economic evaluations on one's likelihood 
of voting for the European People's Party by the responsibility 
one assigns to the EU with 95% CIs
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Data source:  European Election Study surveys 2009 and 2014
Results calculated while holding Affiliating with the EPP at zero, or not affiliating
Figure 3:  The effects of economic evaluations on one's likelihood 
of voting for the European People's Party by the responsibility 
one assigns to the EU with 95% CIs
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